Key Takeaways
- The *Laches* is not a failed attempt to define courage but a performed demonstration that courage cannot be extracted from the soul's total architecture—making it Plato's earliest diagnostic instrument for exposing the gap between enacted virtue and conceptual self-knowledge.
- Socrates' method in the *Laches* prefigures what depth psychology calls the confrontation with the shadow: the two generals who have displayed physical bravery their entire lives are revealed to be psychologically ignorant of the very quality that defines them, an estrangement between deed and self-understanding that mirrors the modern analysand's dissociation from his own complexes.
- The dialogue's aporetic ending is not a failure of dialectic but an enactment of Plato's "Errant Cause" (ananke): the rational pursuit of definition is necessarily defeated by an irreducible remainder in the soul that cannot be persuaded by logos alone, positioning the *Laches* as an early dramatization of Hillman's thesis that pathologizing is a first principle, not a deviation.
Courage in the Laches Is Not a Concept to Be Defined but a Psychic Condition to Be Diagnosed
The Laches opens with a question about education—how should Lysimachus and Melesias raise their sons?—and rapidly converts this pragmatic concern into an investigation of courage (andreia). Socrates does not approach courage as a philosopher drafting taxonomy. He approaches it as a clinician would approach a symptom: by pressing the two Athenian generals, Laches and Nicias, to articulate what they already embody. The dialogue’s brilliance lies in the exposure that follows. Laches, who stood firm at Delium, defines courage as “remaining at one’s post,” then collapses under cross-examination. Nicias, the strategist, defines it as “knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be hoped for,” only to discover this definition swallows all of virtue and cannot isolate courage as a discrete part. Neither man possesses self-knowledge commensurate with his reputation. What Plato stages here is not a logical puzzle but a psychological revelation: the soul can enact a quality while remaining structurally unconscious of it. This gap—between lived virtue and reflective awareness—is precisely the territory that Jungian analysis maps as the ego-Self axis. As Edinger demonstrated through Plato’s cave simile in the Republic, the soul projects its internal realities outward and mistakes shadows for substance. The Laches catches projection in its earliest, most intimate form: the projection of one’s own virtue onto action, so that one never needs to encounter the virtue as an interior reality. Socrates functions here not as teacher but as analyst, creating the conditions under which the generals’ unconscious identification with courage begins to dissolve.
The Aporetic Ending Enacts Ananke, Not Dialectical Failure
Conventional scholarship treats the Laches as an “early” or “aporetic” dialogue, implying Plato had not yet developed the philosophical machinery to resolve the question. This reading misses the structural intention. The dialogue ends without a definition not because Plato lacks one, but because the soul’s relationship to courage resists final formulation. James Hillman, drawing on the Timaeus, identified two co-creating principles in Plato’s universe: Nous (Reason) and Ananke (Necessity), the latter characterized as the “Errant Cause”—rambling, irrational, never fully subdued by rational persuasion. Hillman argued that “reason never wholly persuades necessity. Both are present as creating principles, always.” The Laches dramatizes this dyad in miniature. Socrates (Nous) pursues a definition with relentless logical pressure, and each attempt errs, wanders, deviates from its target. The errancy is not incidental; it is the dialogue’s content. Courage, as a quality rooted in the thumos—the chest, the site of endurance, what Cody Peterson calls the engine of “Intake + Containment = Constitution”—belongs precisely to that domain of the soul that resists governance by logos. Plato could not define courage in the Laches because courage is not primarily a rational form; it is a thumic condition, forged in the body’s encounter with fear, and the Laches honestly registers this resistance. The aporia is not a dead end but a diagnostic finding: the soul contains an irreducible remainder that definition cannot capture.
Socrates as Daimon: The Laches and the Therapeutic Encounter
Hillman, in The Myth of Analysis, identified Socrates as the first figure in Western consciousness to embody what depth psychology calls the therapeutic relationship. Citing the Laches explicitly (185E), Hillman placed it alongside the Protagoras, Apology, and Gorgias as evidence that Socrates’ effect on others was not primarily intellectual but psychic—a “teaching-healing” that operated through presence, not proposition. In the Laches, this dynamic is visible in Socrates’ peculiar authority. He is not a general. He has no military theory. Yet both Laches and Nicias defer to him, and Laches even testifies to Socrates’ extraordinary courage at the retreat from Delium. Socrates’ power in the dialogue derives from the fact that he is the only participant who understands that he does not know what courage is—and this acknowledged ignorance is itself a form of psychological courage more radical than anything the generals display. The Socratic elenchus here mirrors what Murray Stein describes as the Platonic model of transformation: the philosopher, having glimpsed the Forms, holds the warring factions of the soul together and “elicits unity of aim among them.” Socrates does not resolve the generals’ confusion; he holds the space in which their confusion becomes visible to them. The Laches is the earliest extant record of a therapeutic container constructed through dialogue.
The Demotion of Thumos Begins Here
Peterson’s account of Plato’s “catastrophic misreading” of the Homeric soul—severing thumos from its sovereignty and subordinating it to logistikon—finds its opening act in the Laches. The dialogue does not yet execute the full tripartite schema of the Republic, but it prepares the ground. By subjecting courage to dialectical definition, Plato begins the process of relocating a thumic virtue into the jurisdiction of knowledge. Nicias’ definition—courage as a form of epistēmē—is the prototype for the intellectualization of what Homer understood as a somatic, relational, endurance-based faculty. The Laches is the hinge. It shows Plato still honest enough to register that the intellectualization fails (the aporia), but already committed to the method that will eventually succeed in the Republic by fiat rather than by argument. What makes the Laches irreplaceable for anyone encountering depth psychology today is precisely this honesty. It preserves the moment before the Western psyche sealed its bargain with rationalism—the moment when courage was still recognized as belonging to a domain that logos could approach but never annex. For the clinician, the teacher, or the patient who senses that their most vital qualities resist articulation, the Laches offers not a solution but a mirror: the soul’s deepest capacities live in the region where definition fails and endurance begins.
Sources Cited
- Plato. (c. 380 BCE). Laches (B. Jowett, Trans.). Various editions.
- Schmid, W. T. (1992). On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato's Laches. Southern Illinois University Press.
- Koziak, B. (2000). Retrieving Political Emotion: Thumos, Aristotle, and Gender. Penn State University Press.
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